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Whalley specify a different elasticity of substitution for each product class, which is assumed to be identical across all countries for each product class. An additional difference between this paper and those of Deardorff et al. is that the latter assume an exogenous money wage rate, permit nominal expenditure to vary only by changes in tariff revenue, and focus on changes in employment. Real wages change because the prices of traded goods change, but the essentially fixed nominal expenditure combines with the fixed money wage to preclude the real wage from changing sufficiently to clear the labor market. This can generate unemployment. The authors could have extended their model by positing monetary or fiscal policy that removed the slack in the labor market. Brown and Whalley (1980) and Whalley (mimeograph) permit wage and rent changes to clear the factor market just as we do. Any important difference in the conclusions of this model and those of the other general equilibrium models is likely to be a result of the above differences in assumptions. Strict comparability is not possible, however, since the above make no statement about functional income distribution.
The papers that have disaggregated labor have taken a short-run perspective in that they have not permitted the full simultaneous determination of product or factor prices across sectors of the economy: wage rates are assumed to be fixed and the supply curve of value added is flat. This includes Baldwin (1976a Baldwin ( , 1976b ); Baldwin, Mutti, and Richardson (1980); and Cline et al. (1978) . Moreover, these also focus on employment changes, rather than functional income distribution. This paper considers five applications of the basic model. In our first set of simulations, natural resources, land and reproducible capital are perfect substitutes for one another, and we do not distinguish between various types of labor, simply assuming that if one man's wage is twice that of another in the base period, then one man-year of the former's labor is equivalent to two man-years of the latter's labor. These aggregates are referred to as capital and labor, and we suppose that both factors are perfectly mobile within the U.S. economy. The results of these simulations are summarized in table 1.
In our second set of simulations, we assume that reproducible capital, land and each of the various depletable assets (ores, coal, and petroleum) in extractive industries 5-10 are distinct and there is no capacity for substitution between them. Similarly, labor is broken down into five categories: farmers, less skilled labor, skilled craftsmen, scientists and professionals, and non-farm managers, and again, there is no ability to substitute one factor for another. Furthermore, we assume that all of these factors are mobile within the U.S. economy, although each depletable asset is used by only one input-output industry. The results of these simulations are summarized in An important development in the evolution of studies concerned with comparative advantage has been the role of human capital.5 This paper explicitly acknowledges that contribution by performing a set of simulations in which less skilled labor is the only mobile factor. The other factors are characterized by varying degrees of immobility due to sector specific human capital. Professionals, managers, and craftsmen are assumed to embody training costs that preclude immediate sectoral reallocation, whereas farmers are assumed to require major geographic reallocation. Thus, table 5 presents simulations that are identical to the fourth set except for the perfect mobility of less skilled labor.
In each simulation, all revenues from tariffs and indirect business taxes, as well as revenue equal to the balance of payments deficit, are distributed to the factors of production as a proportional income subsidy, and each factor of production is assumed to spend all of its disposable income. Throughout the paper we refer to this measure of income and expenditure, divided by the price of the consumption bundle, as real income, and denote it by Y in the tables.
III. Data'
The 1967 flow input-output table used for this study was obtained from Walderhaug (1977) . It includes competitive intermediate imports of good i, which are valued at foreign ports, as an input into the production of its counterpart domestic good i. We eliminated this element, and entries in the transportation, wholesale and retail trade, and insurance industries associated with importing it. Had we not done so, imports into each industry would have been proportional to domestic output in alternative simulations of the model. The direct coefficients matrix was then calculated so that the domestic cost of producing a unit of domestic good i was unity.
The base period output of each good was computed as the value presented in the input-output 
IV. Conclusions
All of the following conclusions are made with respect to the 1967 base period.
A . Gener-al Conc lusions fton All Five) Tables
Conclusions in subsection A refer to all five tables except where indicated.
1. With perfect factor mobility in the long run, no matter whether the factors are homogeneous or heterogeneous (tables 1 and 2), U.S. trade barriers protect U.S. capital at the expense of U.S. labor, and foreign trade barriers protect U.S. labor at the expense of U.S. capital. These inferences are made by removing one protective structure while holding the other constant, and observing how real factor incomes change. This result is surprising. The two sector, two country Heckscher-Ohlin model, with identical and homothetic tastes in both countries, predicts that the domestic and foreign tariffs would have identical effects on relative factor prices in the United States. Similarly, prohibitive American tariffs would have precisely the same effects on resource allocation as prohibitive foreign tariffs in any model. Thus, we expected to find that U.S. and foreign tariffs protected the same factor of production within the United States. When either tariff structure was made prohibitive in the two factor case, our simulations generated a wage of zero for American labor (not shown). That the return to one factor should fall to zero is consistent with the fixed proportions nature of the model, and that labor is the factor which is harmed is consistent with Leontief's finding that labor is America's plentiful factor. This creates a presumption that higher tariffs by either country will be detrimental to American labor. However, Hartigan's (1981b) regressions of tariffs (plus the tariff equivalents of import quotas and voluntary export restraints) on capital intensity demonstrate that both the United States and its trading partners tend to protect industries which are capital intensive according to U.S. factor requirements, and this is consistent with our results.
Trade policy affects income radically. This is because
a. Foreign and domestic production are perfect substitutes. Thus imports can entirely replace a domestic industry. This permits a high degree of specialization. It also means that the United States can expand exports in a sector to a large multiple of that occurring in the base year, making it possible for a change in one tariff to have a significant impact on income distribution. Except when multiple solutions occur, the number of exporting industries cannot be greater than the number of factors of production. These are 2 in the homogeneous case, 12 in the heterogeneous case, and 95 when a percentage of each industry's capital stock is sector specific.
b. The fixity of input coefficients in production and of the coefficients of absorption into final consumption reduces the elasticity of the economy's derived demands for factors. This combined with fixed aggregate factor supplies means that a change in the domestic prices of tradables will tend to produce a large change in factor prices.
3. There is some nonmonotonicity present in the real returns of factors of production with respect to changes in the degree of protection. The easiest case to discuss is that of farmers when the United States unilaterally reduces its trade barriers. Consider livestock and livestock products; other agricultural products; forestry and fishery products; and agricultural, forestry, and fishery services. These are the only industries that employ either land and/or farmers. The land input-output coefficients are 0.05544, 0.10645, 0.13744, and 0.00000, respectively. The farmer input-output coefficients are 0.03380, 0.06548, 0.00000, and 0.02791. respectively. These industries are protected by ad valorem tariffs and tariff equivalents of 0. 175, 0.084, 0.012, and 0.000, respectively. When barriers are cut by 50%, livestock and livestock products, initially protected by high barriers, are replaced entirely by imports. The most land intensive industry, forestry and fishery products, contracts its production to approximately 15%l of the base year. This releases a significant amount of land, which is not completely absorbed by the expan-sion of other agricultural products. Thus, land's rental rate is zero. Other agricultural products, which is most intensive in the use of farmers, expands the most, driving up the farmers' wage rate to 354.7%/f of that in the base period.7 The complete removal of U.S. trade impediments leads to marginal increases in the production of forestry and fishery products, and agricultural, forestry, and fishery services, and marginal contraction in other agricultural products. Land's rental rate is still zero, and the slight decline in the production of the most farm labor intensive industry generates a decline in the demand for farmers that is not counterbalanced by an increase in the output of agricultural, forestry, and fishery services. Thus, farmers' real wage falls to 354.1%7c of that in the base period. Because the input-output coefficient for each factor of production is so small, a slight change in the structure of product prices leads to highly magnified changes in factor prices.
U.S. real income is a decreasing function of both U.S. and foreign trade barriers. Since there are no terms of trade effects, this is expected.
5. In the base period simulation, multiple equilibria were obtained, all with equal values for the objective function (U.S. real expenditure out of factor incomes), i.e., the domestic price plane was tangent to a facet of the production possibility frontier, but the value of U.S. real expenditure varied with the amount of tariff and indirect business tax revenue collected, so that U.S. welfare is indeterminate. Thus, the base period simulation to which we refer is the one for which each sector's output was constrained to that actually observed in 1967.
6. The welfare corresponding to any configuration of tariffs is higher the more factor mobility and generally higher the more substitutability we assume, i.e., the more flexible is the economy. This is because the production gains from trade will be larger, the less is the curvature of the production possibility frontier.8 7. Decreases cause larger welfare changes than increases in either tariff structure. This is because some tariffs are close to zero, so that when tariffs are multiplied by a common factor, the economy specializes in importing goods with low domestic tariffs, and exporting goods with low foreign tariffs. On the other hand, lower U.S. tariffs encourage U.S. specialization in those commodities in which a comparative advantage exists, generating substantial efficiency gains. Similarly, lower foreign tariffs increase some export prices significantly, and thereby permit much more efficiency through increased specialization in exportables for which profitability has increased. 8. With flexible relative prices, any attempt to fix the nominal return of a factor whose real return is declining is likely to lead to currency depreciation.
9. Unilateral and reciprocal tariff cuts always appreciate the dollar when the monetary authority freezes the value of the CPI. That this should be true for unilateral reductions is surprising, but this possibility has been noted by Johnson (1966) . The appreciation of the dollar in this model can be explained in part by the decline in the prices paid to foreigners for the five goods for which the United States imposes quotas and the rents accrue to foreigners; and by the expansion of the sectors from which the United States exports in free trade to substantial multiples of the base period values.9 10. It is intei-esting to note the exports in which the economy concentrates under various trade policies. They are noted only for the homogeneous case for brevity. In simulations 1.1 and 1.2 they are other agricultural products and mis-I Note that the figures for farmers' wages in this paragraph refer to real wages, not real incomes, since the latter include the proportional income subsidy. 8 Thus we expect that for a given trade policy and degree of factor mobility U.S. real income will be highest in table 3 and lowest in table 4. This is always true for unilateral barrier elimination. However, reciprocal free trade generates some anomalies due to sectorally nonuniform business taxes. Compare for example, 3.8, 4.8, and 5.8 in which 3.8 generated the lowest level of welfare but had the highest degree of factor mobility. The value of the objective function of the linear program always has the correct ranking. However, indirect business tax revenue in 3.8 was substantially lower than in the corresponding simulations due to a different structure of production.
9 Simulations performed with each sector's exports constrained to not exceed that sector's base year gross exports by a multiple of three always generated a devaluation of the dollar (not shown). This suggests that the ability of the economy to specialize in a small number of exportables, which can expand at a fixed world price, is the cause of the appreciation of the dollar. The expansion of the domestic production of these sectors and its attendant effect on income distribution is discussed in subsection B.9.
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cellaneous fabricated textile products. In 1.4, 1.5, 1.8, and 1.9 it is aircraft and parts. In 1.6 and 1.7 it is tobacco manufactures and miscellaneous fabricated textiles. l0 8. Extractive resources experience qualitatively identical effects to those of land, except they gain from reciprocal barrier increases.
9. The structure of production that produces these distributional effects will be discussed for unilateral U.S. barrier elimination. The focus will be on export industries, since these have expanded the most. Moreover, the degree of factor mobility makes a substantial quantitative difference, with reciprocal free trade reducing less skilled labor's real income by 79%c in the short run and raising it by 50% in the long run, and with unilateral cuts lowering it by 62% in the short run and raising it by 67% in the long run, when land and capital are the immobile factors. Furthermore, which factors are deemed immobile is of substantial quantitative importance. With unilateral liberalization, less skilled labor's real income rises by 72% in the short run when all factors are immobile, and falls by 58% in the short run when less skilled labor is the only perfectly mobile factor. For reciprocal liberalization in the short run, the figures are an increase of 9% and a decrease of 84%, respectively. For less skilled labor, the short-run scenarios with land and capital being the immobile factors are similar to less skilled labor being the only perfectly mobile factor. Can it be that this last result explains some of the conflict between the economists who take a long-run view of free trade and the politician or labor leader who takes a shorter view'? " The distribution of the returns to the sector specific factors in the three versions of the shor-t run was based on the assumption that capital is the least mobile productive factor. and should bear the entire cost of the immobility in an industry. Once the return to capital within an industry fell to zero, the other factors in that industry, subject to mobility constraints, shared in that excess immobility cost in proportion to the rental rates of their mobile counterparts. Note that the ratio of the real income of skilled craftsmen to that of workers will equal the ratio of their wages only when neither of these factors are subject to mobility constraints. This is because mobility costs are netted from gross incomes to determine the incomes reported in the tables.
'2 An analogous result occurs in a simple version of our model. Suppose that labor and capital in the United States combine to produce two outputs. This generates a two faceted production possibility frontier (PPF) with the laborintensive exportable on the horizontal axis and the capitalintensive importable on the vertical. Assume that production is initially at the kink in the PPF with the tariff-inclusive price line having a slope between that of the two constraints, and the world relative price line is steeper than both constraints. Moreover, assume that both goods in the United States are absorbed in fixed proportions, with the United States initially an exporter of the labor-intensive good. If the United States unilaterally eliminates its tariff, labor's income will fall in the short run, so long as capital's mobility constraint is binding, but will rise in the long run when this mobility constraint ceases to bind.
